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Windows Filtering Platform Filter Added To Block EDR Process
The following analytic detects Windows Filtering Platform filters that are added and configured to block outbound traffic for known EDR and security agent processes. Tools such as EDRSilencer abuse WFP to disrupt outbound telemetry from EDR processes, which can bypass detections that only look for the tool process name. This detection looks for WFP add events with a block action and EDR process names embedded in the hexdump-like Conditions field.
Detection Query
`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=5447
ChangeType IN ("%%16384", "Add")
Action IN ("%%16389", "Block")
Conditions=*
| eval conditions_text=coalesce(Conditions,"")
| rex mode=sed field=conditions_text "s/-/ /g"
| rex mode=sed field=conditions_text "s/[0-9A-Fa-f]{8}\s+([0-9A-Fa-f]{2}\s+){1,16}//g"
| eval conditions_normalized=lower(replace(conditions_text, "[^A-Za-z0-9]", ""))
| eval edr_process=case(
like(conditions_normalized, "%msmpengexe%"), "MsMpEng.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%mssenseexe%"), "MsSense.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%senseirexe%"), "SenseIR.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sensendrexe%"), "SenseNdr.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sensecncproxyexe%"), "SenseCncProxy.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sensesampleuploaderexe%"), "SenseSampleUploader.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%winlogbeatexe%"), "winlogbeat.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%elasticagentexe%"), "elastic-agent.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%elasticendpointexe%"), "elastic-endpoint.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%filebeatexe%"), "filebeat.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%xagtexe%"), "xagt.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%qualysagentexe%"), "QualysAgent.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelagentexe%"), "SentinelAgent.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelagentworkerexe%"), "SentinelAgentWorker.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelservicehostexe%"), "SentinelServiceHost.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelstaticengineexe%"), "SentinelStaticEngine.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%logprocessorserviceexe%"), "LogProcessorService.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelstaticenginescannerexe%"), "SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelhelperserviceexe%"), "SentinelHelperService.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelbrowsernativehostexe%"), "SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cylancesvcexe%"), "CylanceSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%amsvcexe%"), "AmSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cramtrayexe%"), "CrAmTray.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%crssvcexe%"), "CrsSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%executionpreventionsvcexe%"), "ExecutionPreventionSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cybereasonavexe%"), "CybereasonAV.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cbexe%"), "cb.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%repmgrexe%"), "RepMgr.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%reputilsexe%"), "RepUtils.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%repuxexe%"), "RepUx.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%repwavexe%"), "RepWAV.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%repwscexe%"), "RepWSC.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%taniumclientexe%"), "TaniumClient.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%taniumcxexe%"), "TaniumCX.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%taniumdetectengineexe%"), "TaniumDetectEngine.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%trapsexe%"), "Traps.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cyserverexe%"), "cyserver.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cyveraserviceexe%"), "CyveraService.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cyvrfsfltexe%"), "CyvrFsFlt.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%fortiedrexe%"), "fortiedr.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sfcexe%"), "sfc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%eiconnectorexe%"), "EIConnector.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%ekrnexe%"), "ekrn.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%hurukaiexe%"), "hurukai.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cetasvcexe%"), "CETASvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%wscommunicatorexe%"), "WSCommunicator.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%endpointbasecampexe%"), "EndpointBasecamp.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%tmlistenexe%"), "TmListen.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%ntrtscanexe%"), "Ntrtscan.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%tmwscsvcexe%"), "TmWSCSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%pccntmonexe%"), "PccNTMon.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%tmbmsrvexe%"), "TMBMSRV.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cntaosmgrexe%"), "CNTAoSMgr.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%tmccsfexe%"), "TmCCSF.exe"
)
| where isnotnull(edr_process)
| eval user=coalesce(UserName,user,"unknown")
| eval filter_action=case(Action="%%16389","Block", true(), Action),
change_type=case(ChangeType="%%16384","Add", true(), ChangeType)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
values(filter_action) as filter_action
values(change_type) as change_type
values(edr_process) as edr_process
values(ProviderName) as provider_name
values(FilterType) as filter_type
values(FilterId) as filter_id
values(LayerName) as layer_name
values(LayerId) as layer_id
values(Conditions) as conditions
values(CalloutName) as callout_name
BY dest user process_id FilterName
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_filtering_platform_filter_added_to_block_edr_process_filter`Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Data Sources
Windows Event Log Security 5447
References
Raw Content
name: Windows Filtering Platform Filter Added To Block EDR Process
id: 8bb64b2a-299e-4ddc-a7e1-037bdc5b904a
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-08-23'
modification_date: '2026-08-23'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
The following analytic detects Windows Filtering Platform filters that are added and configured to block outbound traffic for known EDR and security agent processes.
Tools such as EDRSilencer abuse WFP to disrupt outbound telemetry from EDR processes, which can bypass detections that only look for the tool process name.
This detection looks for WFP add events with a block action and EDR process names embedded in the hexdump-like Conditions field.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 5447
search: |-
`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=5447
ChangeType IN ("%%16384", "Add")
Action IN ("%%16389", "Block")
Conditions=*
| eval conditions_text=coalesce(Conditions,"")
| rex mode=sed field=conditions_text "s/-/ /g"
| rex mode=sed field=conditions_text "s/[0-9A-Fa-f]{8}\s+([0-9A-Fa-f]{2}\s+){1,16}//g"
| eval conditions_normalized=lower(replace(conditions_text, "[^A-Za-z0-9]", ""))
| eval edr_process=case(
like(conditions_normalized, "%msmpengexe%"), "MsMpEng.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%mssenseexe%"), "MsSense.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%senseirexe%"), "SenseIR.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sensendrexe%"), "SenseNdr.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sensecncproxyexe%"), "SenseCncProxy.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sensesampleuploaderexe%"), "SenseSampleUploader.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%winlogbeatexe%"), "winlogbeat.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%elasticagentexe%"), "elastic-agent.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%elasticendpointexe%"), "elastic-endpoint.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%filebeatexe%"), "filebeat.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%xagtexe%"), "xagt.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%qualysagentexe%"), "QualysAgent.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelagentexe%"), "SentinelAgent.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelagentworkerexe%"), "SentinelAgentWorker.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelservicehostexe%"), "SentinelServiceHost.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelstaticengineexe%"), "SentinelStaticEngine.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%logprocessorserviceexe%"), "LogProcessorService.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelstaticenginescannerexe%"), "SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelhelperserviceexe%"), "SentinelHelperService.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sentinelbrowsernativehostexe%"), "SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cylancesvcexe%"), "CylanceSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%amsvcexe%"), "AmSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cramtrayexe%"), "CrAmTray.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%crssvcexe%"), "CrsSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%executionpreventionsvcexe%"), "ExecutionPreventionSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cybereasonavexe%"), "CybereasonAV.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cbexe%"), "cb.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%repmgrexe%"), "RepMgr.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%reputilsexe%"), "RepUtils.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%repuxexe%"), "RepUx.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%repwavexe%"), "RepWAV.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%repwscexe%"), "RepWSC.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%taniumclientexe%"), "TaniumClient.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%taniumcxexe%"), "TaniumCX.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%taniumdetectengineexe%"), "TaniumDetectEngine.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%trapsexe%"), "Traps.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cyserverexe%"), "cyserver.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cyveraserviceexe%"), "CyveraService.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cyvrfsfltexe%"), "CyvrFsFlt.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%fortiedrexe%"), "fortiedr.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%sfcexe%"), "sfc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%eiconnectorexe%"), "EIConnector.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%ekrnexe%"), "ekrn.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%hurukaiexe%"), "hurukai.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cetasvcexe%"), "CETASvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%wscommunicatorexe%"), "WSCommunicator.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%endpointbasecampexe%"), "EndpointBasecamp.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%tmlistenexe%"), "TmListen.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%ntrtscanexe%"), "Ntrtscan.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%tmwscsvcexe%"), "TmWSCSvc.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%pccntmonexe%"), "PccNTMon.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%tmbmsrvexe%"), "TMBMSRV.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%cntaosmgrexe%"), "CNTAoSMgr.exe",
like(conditions_normalized, "%tmccsfexe%"), "TmCCSF.exe"
)
| where isnotnull(edr_process)
| eval user=coalesce(UserName,user,"unknown")
| eval filter_action=case(Action="%%16389","Block", true(), Action),
change_type=case(ChangeType="%%16384","Add", true(), ChangeType)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
values(filter_action) as filter_action
values(change_type) as change_type
values(edr_process) as edr_process
values(ProviderName) as provider_name
values(FilterType) as filter_type
values(FilterId) as filter_id
values(LayerName) as layer_name
values(LayerId) as layer_id
values(Conditions) as conditions
values(CalloutName) as callout_name
BY dest user process_id FilterName
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_filtering_platform_filter_added_to_block_edr_process_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
To implement this analytic, enable auditing for Windows Filtering Platform policy changes and ingest Windows Security Event Log data with EventCode 5447. The Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows should extract fields such as EventCode, ChangeType, FilterName, Conditions, and Action from XmlWinEventLog:Security events.
known_false_positives: |-
Legitimate firewall, VPN, EDR, and Group Policy changes can add WFP block filters.
Tune by approved ProviderName, LayerName, FilterName, or known administrative windows after validating the WFP filter context.
references:
- https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5447
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fwp/auditing-and-logging
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: Windows Filtering Platform block filter targeting [$edr_process$] was detected on [$dest$].
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: edr_process
type: process_name
- field: FilterName
type: signature
analytic_story:
- Disabling Security Tools
- Security Solution Tampering
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1685
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1685/edr_silencer/windows-security-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit