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Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request

The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests where the requesting account name matches the service name, potentially indicating an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. This detection leverages Event ID 4769 from Domain Controller and Kerberos events. Such activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to escalate privileges by impersonating a domain controller. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to take control of the domain controller, leading to complete domain compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769
  | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(ServiceName) = lower(mvindex(split(TargetUserName,"@"),0)),1,0)
  | where isSuspicious = 1
  | rename Computer as dest
  | rename TargetUserName as user
  | table _time, dest, src_ip, user, ServiceName, Error_Code, isSuspicious
  | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`

Author

Mauricio Velazco, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Windows Event Log Security 4769

Tags

sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller ImpersonationActive Directory Kerberos AttacksActive Directory Privilege Escalation
Raw Content
name: Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request
id: 8b1297bc-6204-11ec-b7c4-acde48001122
version: 10
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests where the requesting account name matches the service name, potentially indicating an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. This detection leverages Event ID 4769 from Domain Controller and Kerberos events. Such activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to escalate privileges by impersonating a domain controller. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to take control of the domain controller, leading to complete domain compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4769
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769
      | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(ServiceName) = lower(mvindex(split(TargetUserName,"@"),0)),1,0)
      | where isSuspicious = 1
      | rename Computer as dest
      | rename TargetUserName as user
      | table _time, dest, src_ip, user, ServiceName, Error_Code, isSuspicious
      | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/02636893-7a1f-4357-af9a-b672e3e3de13
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $user$ on host $dest$
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation
        - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
        - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
    asset_type: Endpoint
    cve:
        - CVE-2021-42287
        - CVE-2021-42278
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1078.002
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog