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splunk_escuTTP
Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned
The following analytic detects the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to a user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify when the "Add member to role" operation includes the "Global Administrator" role. This activity is significant because the Global Administrator role grants extensive access to data, resources, and settings, similar to a Domain Administrator in traditional AD environments. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, and potentially gain control over Azure resources, posing a severe security risk.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role" properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue="*Global Administrator*"
| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename userAgent as user_agent
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
initiatedBy signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_global_administrator_role_assigned_filter`Author
Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Azure Active Directory Add member to role
References
- https://o365blog.com/post/admin/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=4277
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/security-planning
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
Tags
Azure Active Directory PersistenceAzure Active Directory Privilege EscalationScattered Lapsus$ Hunters
Raw Content
name: Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned
id: 825fed20-309d-4fd1-8aaf-cd49c1bb093c
version: 13
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to a user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify when the "Add member to role" operation includes the "Global Administrator" role. This activity is significant because the Global Administrator role grants extensive access to data, resources, and settings, similar to a Domain Administrator in traditional AD environments. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, and potentially gain control over Azure resources, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
- Azure Active Directory Add member to role
search: |-
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role" properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue="*Global Administrator*"
| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename userAgent as user_agent
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
initiatedBy signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_global_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives: Administrators may legitimately assign the Global Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://o365blog.com/post/admin/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=4277
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/security-planning
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: Global Administrator Role assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
- field: initiatedBy
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Persistence
- Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: threat
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.003/azure_ad_assign_global_administrator/azure-audit.log
source: Azure AD
sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad