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splunk_escuTTP
Windows File Download Via CertUtil
The following analytic detects the use of `certutil.exe` to download files using the `-URL`, `-urlcache` or '-verifyctl' arguments. This behavior is identified by monitoring command-line executions for these specific arguments via Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity is significant because `certutil.exe` is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to download and execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to download and execute arbitrary files, potentially leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE `process_certutil`
AND
((Processes.process IN ("*-URL *", "*/URL *"))
OR
(Processes.process IN ("*urlcache*", "*verifyctl*")
AND
Processes.process IN ("*/f *", "*-f *")))
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_file_download_via_certutil_filter`Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali, Michael Haag, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data
References
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/
- https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats
- https://web.archive.org/web/20210921110637/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl
Tags
Living Off The LandIngress Tool TransferProxyNotShellDarkSide RansomwareForest BlizzardFlax TyphoonCompromised Windows HostCISA AA22-277ACisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
Raw Content
name: Windows File Download Via CertUtil
id: 7fac8d40-e370-45ea-a4a3-031bbcc18b02
version: 5
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of `certutil.exe` to download files using the `-URL`, `-urlcache` or '-verifyctl' arguments. This behavior is identified by monitoring command-line executions for these specific arguments via Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity is significant because `certutil.exe` is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to download and execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to download and execute arbitrary files, potentially leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
- Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE `process_certutil`
AND
((Processes.process IN ("*-URL *", "*/URL *"))
OR
(Processes.process IN ("*urlcache*", "*verifyctl*")
AND
Processes.process IN ("*/f *", "*-f *")))
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_file_download_via_certutil_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/
- https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats
- https://web.archive.org/web/20210921110637/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
tags:
analytic_story:
- Living Off The Land
- Ingress Tool Transfer
- ProxyNotShell
- DarkSide Ransomware
- Forest Blizzard
- Flax Typhoon
- Compromised Windows Host
- CISA AA22-277A
- Cisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1105
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test - Sysmon
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
- name: True Positive Test - Cisco NVM
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/cisco_network_visibility_module/cisco_nvm_flowdata/nvm_flowdata.log
source: not_applicable
sourcetype: cisco:nvm:flowdata