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Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption

The following analytic detects Kerberos service ticket requests using RC4 encryption, leveraging Kerberos Event 4769. This method identifies potential Golden Ticket attacks, where adversaries forge Kerberos Granting Tickets (TGT) using the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash to gain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Monitoring for RC4 encryption usage is significant as it is rare in modern networks, indicating possible malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, attackers could move laterally and execute code on remote systems, compromising the entire network. Note: This detection may be bypassed if attackers use the AES key instead of the NTLM hash.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1558.001

Detection Query

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName="*$" (TicketOptions=0x40810000 OR TicketOptions=0x40800000 OR TicketOptions=0x40810010) TicketEncryptionType=0x17
  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest, service, service_id,
       TicketEncryptionType, TicketOptions
  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
  | `kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter`

Author

Mauricio Velazco, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Windows Event Log Security 4769

References

Tags

Active Directory Kerberos AttacksActive Directory Privilege EscalationScattered Lapsus$ Hunters

Raw Content

name: Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption
id: 7d90f334-a482-11ec-908c-acde48001122
version: 11
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: 'The following analytic detects Kerberos service ticket requests using RC4 encryption, leveraging Kerberos Event 4769. This method identifies potential Golden Ticket attacks, where adversaries forge Kerberos Granting Tickets (TGT) using the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash to gain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Monitoring for RC4 encryption usage is significant as it is rare in modern networks, indicating possible malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, attackers could move laterally and execute code on remote systems, compromising the entire network. Note: This detection may be bypassed if attackers use the AES key instead of the NTLM hash.'
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4769
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName="*$" (TicketOptions=0x40810000 OR TicketOptions=0x40800000 OR TicketOptions=0x40810010) TicketEncryptionType=0x17
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest, service, service_id,
           TicketEncryptionType, TicketOptions
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy systems or applications will use RC4-HMAC as the default encryption for Kerberos Service Ticket requests. Specifically, systems before Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Newer systems will use AES128 or AES256.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
    - https://gist.github.com/TarlogicSecurity/2f221924fef8c14a1d8e29f3cb5c5c4a
    - https://en.hackndo.com/kerberos-silver-golden-tickets/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A Kerberos Service TTicket request with RC4 encryption was requested from $dest$
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
        - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
        - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1558.001
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.001/kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog