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splunk_escuTTP

WMIC XSL Execution via URL

The following analytic detects `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL script via a URL. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on command-line executions that include HTTP/HTTPS URLs and the /FORMAT switch. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing adversaries to execute JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence using a trusted Windows tool, posing a severe threat to the environment.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
`process_wmic`
Processes.process IN ("*http://*", "*https://*")
Processes.process="*/format:*"
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
   Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`

Author

Michael Haag, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data

Tags

Compromised Windows HostSuspicious WMI UseCisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
Raw Content
name: WMIC XSL Execution via URL
id: 787e9dd0-4328-11ec-a029-acde48001122
version: 12
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL script
    via a URL. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data,
    focusing on command-line executions that include HTTP/HTTPS URLs and the /FORMAT
    switch. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control
    bypass, allowing adversaries to execute JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
    If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to execute arbitrary
    code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence using a trusted Windows tool,
    posing a severe threat to the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
    as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    `process_wmic`
    Processes.process IN ("*http://*", "*https://*")
    Processes.process="*/format:*"
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
       Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
    and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
    telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
    you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
    Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
    be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
    the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
    data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
    names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-4---wmic-bypass-using-remote-xsl-file
    - https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/defense_evasion/SDWIN-201017061100.html
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script.
    risk_objects:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
    threat_objects:
        - field: parent_process_name
          type: parent_process_name
        - field: process_name
          type: process_name
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Compromised Windows Host
        - Suspicious WMI Use
        - Cisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1220
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
    - name: True Positive Test - Cisco NVM
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/cisco_network_visibility_module/cisco_nvm_flowdata/nvm_flowdata.log
          source: not_applicable
          sourcetype: cisco:nvm:flowdata