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sublimemediumRule
Brand Impersonation: Procore
Detects messages containing Procore branding language that do not originate from legitimate Procore domains. This has been observed in phishing campaigns.
Detection Query
type.inbound
and (
strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*powered by procore*")
or 2 of (
strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'Procore'),
strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, '6309 Carpinteria Ave'),
strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'Carpinteria, CA 93013')
)
)
and not (
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ("procore.com", "procoretech.com")
and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)
// negating legit replies/forwards
and not (
(
strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "RE:")
or strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "FW:")
or strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "FWD:")
or regex.imatch(subject.subject,
'(\[[^\]]+\]\s?){0,3}(re|fwd?|automat.*)\s?:.*'
)
or strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "Réponse automatique")
)
and (
length(headers.references) > 0
and any(headers.hops, any(.fields, strings.ilike(.name, "In-Reply-To")))
)
)
// negate bounce backs
and not (
strings.like(sender.email.local_part,
"*postmaster*",
"*mailer-daemon*",
"*administrator*"
)
and any(attachments,
.content_type in (
"message/rfc822",
"message/delivery-status",
"text/calendar"
)
)
)
Data Sources
Email MessagesEmail HeadersEmail Attachments
Platforms
email
Raw Content
name: "Brand Impersonation: Procore"
description: "Detects messages containing Procore branding language that do not originate from legitimate Procore domains. This has been observed in phishing campaigns."
type: "rule"
severity: "medium"
source: |
type.inbound
and (
strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*powered by procore*")
or 2 of (
strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'Procore'),
strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, '6309 Carpinteria Ave'),
strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'Carpinteria, CA 93013')
)
)
and not (
sender.email.domain.root_domain in ("procore.com", "procoretech.com")
and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)
// negating legit replies/forwards
and not (
(
strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "RE:")
or strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "FW:")
or strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "FWD:")
or regex.imatch(subject.subject,
'(\[[^\]]+\]\s?){0,3}(re|fwd?|automat.*)\s?:.*'
)
or strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "Réponse automatique")
)
and (
length(headers.references) > 0
and any(headers.hops, any(.fields, strings.ilike(.name, "In-Reply-To")))
)
)
// negate bounce backs
and not (
strings.like(sender.email.local_part,
"*postmaster*",
"*mailer-daemon*",
"*administrator*"
)
and any(attachments,
.content_type in (
"message/rfc822",
"message/delivery-status",
"text/calendar"
)
)
)
attack_types:
- "BEC/Fraud"
- "Credential Phishing"
tactics_and_techniques:
- "Impersonation: Brand"
- "Social engineering"
detection_methods:
- "Content analysis"
- "Sender analysis"
id: "74baa1e5-f1cd-5d15-b2f2-e863baf4a20f"