Detect Renamed RClone

name: Detect Renamed RClone
id: 6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122
version: 11
date: '2026-02-25'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the execution of a renamed `rclone.exe` process, which is commonly used for data exfiltration to remote destinations. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and original file names that do not match. This activity is significant because ransomware groups often use RClone to exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an ongoing data exfiltration attempt, potentially leading to significant data loss and further compromise of the affected systems.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE (
            Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe
            AND
            Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe
        )
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - DarkSide Ransomware
        - Ransomware
        - Black Basta Ransomware
        - Cactus Ransomware
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1020
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog