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GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block

The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method leverages script block text to identify when a list of all local users is being enumerated. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to gather user information for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.

MITRE ATT&CK

execution

Detection Query

`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText="*Get-WmiObject*" AND ScriptBlockText="*Win32_UserAccount*")
  | fillnull
  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest signature signature_id
       user_id vendor_product EventID
       Guid Opcode Name
       Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
       ScriptBlockText
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`

Author

Mauricio Velazco, Splunk

Created

2026-02-25

Data Sources

Powershell Script Block Logging 4104

Tags

Winter VivernActive Directory DiscoveryMalicious PowerShell
Raw Content
name: GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block
id: 640b0eda-0429-11ec-accd-acde48001122
version: 10
date: '2026-02-25'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method leverages script block text to identify when a list of all local users is being enumerated. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to gather user information for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText="*Get-WmiObject*" AND ScriptBlockText="*Win32_UserAccount*")
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest signature signature_id
           user_id vendor_product EventID
           Guid Opcode Name
           Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
           ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-for-malicious-powershell-using-script-block-logging.html
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Winter Vivern
        - Active Directory Discovery
        - Malicious PowerShell
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1059.001
        - T1087.001
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/sbl_xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog