sigmahighHunting

Suspicious Scheduled Task Update

Detects update to a scheduled task event that contain suspicious keywords.

MITRE ATT&CK

executionprivilege-escalationpersistence

Detection Query

selection_eid:
  EventID: 4702
selection_paths:
  TaskContentNew|contains:
    - \AppData\Local\Temp\
    - \AppData\Roaming\
    - \Users\Public\
    - \WINDOWS\Temp\
    - C:\Temp\
    - \Desktop\
    - \Downloads\
    - \Temporary Internet
    - C:\ProgramData\
    - C:\Perflogs\
selection_commands:
  TaskContentNew|contains:
    - regsvr32
    - rundll32
    - cmd.exe</Command>
    - cmd</Command>
    - "<Arguments>/c "
    - "<Arguments>/k "
    - "<Arguments>/r "
    - powershell
    - pwsh
    - mshta
    - wscript
    - cscript
    - certutil
    - bitsadmin
    - bash.exe
    - "bash "
    - scrcons
    - "wmic "
    - wmic.exe
    - forfiles
    - scriptrunner
    - hh.exe
condition: all of selection_*

Author

Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)

Created

2022-12-05

Data Sources

windowssecurity

Platforms

windows

References

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698

Tags

attack.executionattack.privilege-escalationattack.persistenceattack.t1053.005

Raw Content

title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Update
id: 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4
related:
    - id: 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b # ProcCreation schtasks change
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects update to a scheduled task event that contain suspicious keywords.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object Access Events has to be configured to allow this detection. We also recommend extracting the Command field from the embedded XML in the event data.'
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4702
    selection_paths:
        TaskContentNew|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
            - 'C:\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Perflogs\'
    selection_commands:
        TaskContentNew|contains:
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'cmd.exe</Command>'
            - 'cmd</Command>'
            - '<Arguments>/c '
            - '<Arguments>/k '
            - '<Arguments>/r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'bash.exe'
            - 'bash '
            - 'scrcons'
            - 'wmic '
            - 'wmic.exe'
            - 'forfiles'
            - 'scriptrunner'
            - 'hh.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high