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Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition
The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects within the same domain. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute can be abused by adversaries to grant unauthorized access by inheriting permissions from another account. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the domain, posing a severe security risk.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN ("%%1793", -) | rex field=SidHistory "(^%{|^)(?P<SidHistoryMatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | rex field=TargetSid "^(?P<TargetSidmatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | where SidHistoryMatch=TargetSidmatch OR SidHistoryMatch=TargetDomainName | rename TargetSid as userSid, TargetDomainName as userDomainName | table _time action status host user userSid userDomainName SidHistory Logon_ID src_user dest | `windows_ad_same_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`Author
Dean Luxton
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Windows Event Log Security 4742Windows Event Log Security 4738
References
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-sidhistory?redirectedfrom=MSDN
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-assessment-unsecure-sid-history-attribute
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sid-history-injection
Tags
Compromised Windows HostWindows Persistence TechniquesSneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
Raw Content
name: Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition
id: 5fde0b7c-df7a-40b1-9b3a-294c00f0289d
version: 11
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Dean Luxton
type: TTP
status: production
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4742
- Windows Event Log Security 4738
description: The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects within the same domain. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute can be abused by adversaries to grant unauthorized access by inheriting permissions from another account. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the domain, posing a severe security risk.
search: '`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN ("%%1793", -) | rex field=SidHistory "(^%{|^)(?P<SidHistoryMatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | rex field=TargetSid "^(?P<TargetSidmatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | where SidHistoryMatch=TargetSidmatch OR SidHistoryMatch=TargetDomainName | rename TargetSid as userSid, TargetDomainName as userDomainName | table _time action status host user userSid userDomainName SidHistory Logon_ID src_user dest | `windows_ad_same_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting eventcodes `4738` and `4742`. The Advanced Security Audit policy settings `Audit User Account Management` and `Audit Computer Account Management` within `Account Management` all need to be enabled. SID resolution is not required..
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-sidhistory?redirectedfrom=MSDN
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-assessment-unsecure-sid-history-attribute
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sid-history-injection
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$src_user$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search src_user = "$src_user$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$src_user$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$src_user$", "$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: Active Directory SID History Attribute was added to $user$ by $src_user$
risk_objects:
- field: src_user
type: user
score: 50
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Compromised Windows Host
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1134.005
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1134.005/mimikatz/windows-security-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog