Windows WMI Reconnaissance Class Query

name: Windows WMI Reconnaissance Class Query
id: 5e38bd3e-5da7-483d-aa61-27f7e8c27ad1
version: 1
date: '2026-03-03'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The following analytic detects the use of WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) for reconnaissance and system information discovery on Windows endpoints.
    It identifies command-line queries targeting common Win32 WMI classes such as Win32_OperatingSystem, Win32_Processor, csproduct, Win32_DiskDrive, and Win32_PhysicalMemory, which are frequently leveraged to enumerate hardware, operating system details, and system configuration. Adversaries often use these queries during post-exploitation to fingerprint hosts, assess virtualization, and tailor follow-on activity. While WMIC usage can be legitimate for administrative and inventory tasks, suspicious or unexpected execution—particularly by non-administrative users or uncommon parent processes—may indicate malicious reconnaissance aligned with system discovery techniques.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
      as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
      (
        NOT Processes.parent_process_path  IN (
            "*:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
            "*:\\Program Files\\*",
            "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
            "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*"
        )
        OR
        Processes.parent_process_name IN(
            "cmd.exe",
            "powershell*",
            "pwsh.exe"
        )
      )
      AND
      (
        Processes.process_name = "wmic.exe"
        OR
        Processes.original_file_name = "wmic.exe"
      )
      Processes.process IN (
        "*csproduct*",
        "*Win32_BaseBoard*",
        "*Win32_Bios*",
        "*Win32_DiskDrive*",
        "*Win32_DisplayConfiguration*",
        "*Win32_OperatingSystem*",
        "*Win32_PhysicalMemory*",
        "*Win32_PnPEntity*",
        "*Win32_Processor*",
        "*Win32_ShadowCopy*",
        "*win32_ShortcutFile*",
        "*win32_VideoController*"
      )
      by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
      Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
      Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
      Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
      Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_wmi_reconnaissance_class_query_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/py.blankgrabber
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: An instance of [$parent_process_name$] spawning [$process_name$] was identified on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$] attempting to enumerate system information via WMI classes using the Command [$process$].
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
    threat_objects:
        - field: parent_process_name
          type: parent_process_name
        - field: process_name
          type: process_name
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - BlankGrabber Stealer
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1047
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/wmic_classes/wmic_cmd.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog