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Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal
The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged roles to service principals in Azure Active Directory (AD). It leverages the AuditLogs log category from ingested Azure AD events. This activity is significant because assigning elevated permissions to non-human entities can lead to unauthorized access or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these service principals to gain elevated access to Azure resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure. Monitoring this behavior helps prevent privilege escalation and ensures the security of Azure environments.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role"
| rename properties.* as *
| search "targetResources{}.type"=ServicePrincipal
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as roles
| eval role=mvindex(roles,1)
| rename targetResources{}.displayName as apps
| eval displayName=mvindex(apps,0)
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product displayName
initiatedBy result role
signature
| lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description
| search isprvilegedadrole = True
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_to_service_principal_filter`Author
Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Azure Active Directory Add member to role
References
Tags
Azure Active Directory Privilege EscalationNOBELIUM GroupScattered Lapsus$ Hunters
Raw Content
name: Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal
id: 5dfaa3d3-e2e4-4053-8252-16d9ee528c41
version: 12
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged roles to service principals in Azure Active Directory (AD). It leverages the AuditLogs log category from ingested Azure AD events. This activity is significant because assigning elevated permissions to non-human entities can lead to unauthorized access or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these service principals to gain elevated access to Azure resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure. Monitoring this behavior helps prevent privilege escalation and ensures the security of Azure environments.
data_source:
- Azure Active Directory Add member to role
search: |-
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role"
| rename properties.* as *
| search "targetResources{}.type"=ServicePrincipal
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as roles
| eval role=mvindex(roles,1)
| rename targetResources{}.displayName as apps
| eval displayName=mvindex(apps,0)
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product displayName
initiatedBy result role
signature
| lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description
| search isprvilegedadrole = True
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_to_service_principal_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLog log category.
known_false_positives: Administrators may legitimately assign the privileged roles to Service Principals as part of administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$initiatedBy$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search initiatedBy = "$initiatedBy$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$initiatedBy$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$initiatedBy$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: A privileged Azure AD role was assigned to the Service Principal $displayName$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
risk_objects:
- field: initiatedBy
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- NOBELIUM Group
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: identity
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.003/azure_ad_privileged_role_serviceprincipal/azure-audit.log
source: Azure AD
sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad