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Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell
The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-ForestTrust command via PowerShell, commonly used by adversaries to gather domain trust information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Identifying this activity is crucial as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts to map out domain trusts, which can inform further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to understand domain relationships, aiding in lateral movement and privilege escalation within the network.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
OR
Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust*
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
Tags
Active Directory Discovery
Raw Content
name: Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell
id: 584f4884-0bf1-11ec-a5ec-acde48001122
version: 8
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-ForestTrust command via PowerShell, commonly used by adversaries to gather domain trust information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Identifying this activity is crucial as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts to map out domain trusts, which can inform further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to understand domain relationships, aiding in lateral movement and privilege escalation within the network.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
OR
Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust*
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.
references:
- https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Discovery
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1482
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog