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Windows AD Suspicious Attribute Modification

This detection monitors changes to the following Active Directory attributes: "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo", "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity", "msDS-KeyCredentialLink", "scriptPath", and "msTSInitialProgram". Modifications to these attributes can indicate potential malicious activity or privilege escalation attempts. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName IN ("msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo","msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity","scriptPath","msTSInitialProgram") OperationType=%%14674  ```Changes to the attribute "msDS-KeyCredentialLink" are also worth moniroting, however tuning will need to be applied```
  | table _time ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID src_user SubjectLogonId DSName AttributeValue AttributeLDAPDisplayName
  | rename SubjectLogonId as TargetLogonId, src_user as initiator, _time as eventTime
  | appendpipe [
  | map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"]
  | stats min(eventTime) as _time values(initiator) as src_user, values(DSName) as targetDomain, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN, values(ObjectClass) as ObjectClass, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip values(LogonType) as LogonType values(AttributeValue) as AttributeValue values(AttributeLDAPDisplayName) as AttributeLDAPDisplayName
    BY TargetLogonId
  | rex field=ObjectDN "^CN=(?P<cn>.*?),[A-Z]{2}\="
  | eval dest=if(ObjectClass="computer",cn,null), user=if(ObjectClass="user",cn,null)
  | fields - cn
  | `windows_ad_suspicious_attribute_modification_filter`

Author

Dean Luxton

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Windows Event Log Security 5136

Tags

Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
Raw Content
name: Windows AD Suspicious Attribute Modification
id: 5682052e-ce55-4f9f-8d28-59191420b7e0
version: 8
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Dean Luxton
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 5136
description: 'This detection monitors changes to the following Active Directory attributes: "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo", "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity", "msDS-KeyCredentialLink", "scriptPath", and "msTSInitialProgram".  Modifications to these attributes can indicate potential malicious activity or privilege escalation attempts. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.'
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName IN ("msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo","msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity","scriptPath","msTSInitialProgram") OperationType=%%14674  ```Changes to the attribute "msDS-KeyCredentialLink" are also worth moniroting, however tuning will need to be applied```
      | table _time ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID src_user SubjectLogonId DSName AttributeValue AttributeLDAPDisplayName
      | rename SubjectLogonId as TargetLogonId, src_user as initiator, _time as eventTime
      | appendpipe [
      | map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"]
      | stats min(eventTime) as _time values(initiator) as src_user, values(DSName) as targetDomain, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN, values(ObjectClass) as ObjectClass, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip values(LogonType) as LogonType values(AttributeValue) as AttributeValue values(AttributeLDAPDisplayName) as AttributeLDAPDisplayName
        BY TargetLogonId
      | rex field=ObjectDN "^CN=(?P<cn>.*?),[A-Z]{2}\="
      | eval dest=if(ObjectClass="computer",cn,null), user=if(ObjectClass="user",cn,null)
      | fields - cn
      | `windows_ad_suspicious_attribute_modification_filter`
how_to_implement: Ensure you are ingesting Active Directory audit logs - specifically event 5136. See lantern article in references for further on how to onboard AD audit data. Ensure the wineventlog_security macro is configured with the correct indexes.
known_false_positives: If key credentials are regularly assigned to users, these events will need to be tuned out.
references:
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a
    - https://lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$src_user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  src_user = "$src_user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$src_user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$src_user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: $src_user$ has added $AttributeLDAPDisplayName$ ACL rights to $ObjectClass$ $ObjectDN$
    risk_objects:
        - field: src_user
          type: user
          score: 50
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1222.001
        - T1550
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/dacl_abuse/suspicious_acl_modification-windows-security-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog