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splunk_escuAnomaly

GitHub Organizations Repository Archived

The following analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Organizations. The detection monitors GitHub Organizations audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details, repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if proper backups are not maintained.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

`github_organizations` vendor_action=repo.archived
  | fillnull
  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY actor, actor_id, actor_is_bot,
       actor_location.country_code, business, business_id,
       org, org_id, repo,
       repo_id, user_agent, visibility,
       vendor_action
  | eval user=actor
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `github_organizations_repository_archived_filter`

Author

Patrick Bareiss, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

GitHub Organizations Audit Logs

Tags

GitHub Malicious ActivityNPM Supply Chain Compromise
Raw Content
name: GitHub Organizations Repository Archived
id: 4f568a0e-896f-4d94-a2f7-fa6d82ab1f77
version: 7
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Organizations. The detection monitors GitHub Organizations audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details, repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if proper backups are not maintained.
data_source:
    - GitHub Organizations Audit Logs
search: |-
    `github_organizations` vendor_action=repo.archived
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY actor, actor_id, actor_is_bot,
           actor_location.country_code, business, business_id,
           org, org_id, repo,
           repo_id, user_agent, visibility,
           vendor_action
      | eval user=actor
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `github_organizations_repository_archived_filter`
how_to_implement: You must ingest GitHub Organizations logs using Splunk Add-on for Github using a Personal Access Token https://splunk.github.io/splunk-add-on-for-github-audit-log-monitoring/Install/ .
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://splunk.github.io/splunk-add-on-for-github-audit-log-monitoring/Install/
    - https://www.googlecloudcommunity.com/gc/Community-Blog/Monitoring-for-Suspicious-GitHub-Activity-with-Google-Security/ba-p/763610
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: $user$ archived a repository in GitHub Organizations
    risk_objects:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
    threat_objects:
        - field: user_agent
          type: http_user_agent
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - GitHub Malicious Activity
        - NPM Supply Chain Compromise
    asset_type: GitHub
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1485
        - T1195
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: network
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/github_archived_repository/github.json
          source: github
          sourcetype: github:cloud:audit