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sublimemediumRule
Open redirect: ringaraja.net
Message contains use of the ringaraja.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
Detection Query
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "ringaraja.net"
and .href_url.path =~ "/portleti/katalogponudnikov/result.asp"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
// negate use of the redirect by ringaraja
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=[^&]*ringaraja\.net'
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
Data Sources
Email MessagesEmail HeadersEmail Attachments
Platforms
email
Raw Content
name: "Open redirect: ringaraja.net"
description: |
Message contains use of the ringaraja.net open redirect. This has been exploited in the wild.
type: "rule"
severity: "medium"
source: |
type.inbound
and any(body.links,
.href_url.domain.root_domain == "ringaraja.net"
and .href_url.path =~ "/portleti/katalogponudnikov/result.asp"
and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'url=')
// negate use of the redirect by ringaraja
and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
'url=[^&]*ringaraja\.net'
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
attack_types:
- "Credential Phishing"
- "Malware/Ransomware"
tactics_and_techniques:
- "Open redirect"
detection_methods:
- "Sender analysis"
- "URL analysis"
id: "4d9594f4-1e96-5afd-a575-8a16d2d79698"