Cisco ASA - Device File Copy Activity
This analytic detects file copy activity on Cisco ASA devices via CLI or ASDM. Adversaries may copy device files including configurations, logs, packet captures, or system files for reconnaissance, credential extraction, or data exfiltration. While legitimate file operations occur during backups and maintenance, unauthorized copies may indicate malicious activity. The detection monitors for command execution events (message ID 111008 or 111010) containing copy commands targeting running-config, startup-config, packet capture files, or other system files from disk0:, flash:, system:, or capture: locations. Investigate unexpected file copies, especially from non-administrative accounts, during unusual hours, or when combined with other suspicious activities.
Detection Query
`cisco_asa`
message_id IN (111008, 111010)
command = "copy *"
command IN (
"*running-config*",
"*startup-config*",
"*/pcap capture:*",
"* disk0:*",
"* flash:*",
"* system:*"
)
| fillnull
| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime
latest(_time) as lastTime
values(user) as user
values(action) as action
values(message_id) as message_id
values(command) as command
values(src_ip) as src_ip
values(process_name) as process_name
by host
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `cisco_asa___device_file_copy_activity_filter`
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Tags
Raw Content
name: Cisco ASA - Device File Copy Activity
id: 4d7e8f3a-9c2b-4e6f-8a1d-5b9c7e2f4a8c
version: 3
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
This analytic detects file copy activity on Cisco ASA devices via CLI or ASDM.
Adversaries may copy device files including configurations, logs, packet captures, or system files for reconnaissance, credential extraction, or data exfiltration. While legitimate file operations occur during backups and maintenance, unauthorized copies may indicate malicious activity.
The detection monitors for command execution events (message ID 111008 or 111010) containing copy commands targeting running-config, startup-config, packet capture files, or other system files from disk0:, flash:, system:, or capture: locations.
Investigate unexpected file copies, especially from non-administrative accounts, during unusual hours, or when combined with other suspicious activities.
data_source:
- Cisco ASA Logs
search: |
`cisco_asa`
message_id IN (111008, 111010)
command = "copy *"
command IN (
"*running-config*",
"*startup-config*",
"*/pcap capture:*",
"* disk0:*",
"* flash:*",
"* system:*"
)
| fillnull
| stats earliest(_time) as firstTime
latest(_time) as lastTime
values(user) as user
values(action) as action
values(message_id) as message_id
values(command) as command
values(src_ip) as src_ip
values(process_name) as process_name
by host
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `cisco_asa___device_file_copy_activity_filter`
how_to_implement: |
This search requires Cisco ASA syslog data to be ingested into Splunk via the Cisco Security Cloud TA.
To ensure this detection works effectively, configure your ASA and FTD devices to generate and forward message ID 111008 and 111010.
If your logging level is set to 'Notifications' or higher, these messages should already be included, else we recommend setting an event list that keeps the severity level you are using and adds message IDs 111008 and 111010.
You can find specific instructions on how to set this up here : https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/security/pix-500-series-security-appliances/63884-config-asa-00.html.
You can also change the severity level of the above message id's to the syslog level you have currently enabled using the logging message syslog_id level severity_level command in global configuration mode. For more information, see Change the Severity Level of a Syslog Message : https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/asa922/configuration/general/asa-922-general-config/monitor-syslog.html#ID-2121-000006da
known_false_positives: |
Legitimate configuration exports may occur during normal administrative activities. These events should be verified and investigated.
references:
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/arcanedoor-new-espionage-focused-campaign-found-targeting-perimeter-network-devices/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for $host$
search: '%original_detection_search% | search host = $host$'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for $host$
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ($host$) starthoursago=168 endhoursago=1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: User $user$ executed command $command$ to export device configuration from Cisco ASA host $host$.
risk_objects:
- field: host
type: system
score: 20
threat_objects:
- field: src_ip
type: ip_address
- field: command
type: process
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Activity
- ArcaneDoor
asset_type: Network
mitre_attack_id:
- T1005
- T1530
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/cisco_asa/generic/cisco_asa_generic_logs.log
source: not_applicable
sourcetype: cisco:asa