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splunk_escuHunting

Detect Renamed 7-Zip

The following analytic detects the usage of a renamed 7-Zip executable using Sysmon data. It leverages the OriginalFileName field to identify instances where the 7-Zip process has been renamed. This activity is significant as attackers often rename legitimate tools to evade detection while staging or exfiltrating data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate data exfiltration attempts or other unauthorized data manipulation, potentially leading to significant data breaches or loss of sensitive information. Analysts should validate the legitimacy of the 7-Zip executable and investigate parallel processes for further suspicious activities.

MITRE ATT&CK

collection

Detection Query

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE (
        Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe
        AND
        Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe
    )
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`

Author

Michael Haag, Splunk

Created

2026-02-25

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2

Tags

Collection and StagingMalicious Inno Setup Loader
Raw Content
name: Detect Renamed 7-Zip
id: 4057291a-b8cf-11eb-95fe-acde48001122
version: 11
date: '2026-02-25'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the usage of a renamed 7-Zip executable using Sysmon data. It leverages the OriginalFileName field to identify instances where the 7-Zip process has been renamed. This activity is significant as attackers often rename legitimate tools to evade detection while staging or exfiltrating data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate data exfiltration attempts or other unauthorized data manipulation, potentially leading to significant data breaches or loss of sensitive information. Analysts should validate the legitimacy of the 7-Zip executable and investigate parallel processes for further suspicious activities.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE (
            Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe
            AND
            Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe
        )
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Collection and Staging
        - Malicious Inno Setup Loader
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1560.001
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog