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sigmamediumHunting

Potential Direct Syscall of NtOpenProcess

Detects potential calls to NtOpenProcess directly from NTDLL.

MITRE ATT&CK

execution

Detection Query

selection:
  CallTrace|startswith: UNKNOWN
filter_main_vcredist:
  TargetImage|endswith: vcredist_x64.exe
  SourceImage|endswith: vcredist_x64.exe
filter_main_generic:
  SourceImage|contains:
    - :\Program Files (x86)\
    - :\Program Files\
    - :\Windows\System32\
    - :\Windows\SysWOW64\
    - :\Windows\WinSxS\
  TargetImage|contains:
    - :\Program Files (x86)\
    - :\Program Files\
    - :\Windows\System32\
    - :\Windows\SysWOW64\
    - :\Windows\WinSxS\
filter_main_kerneltrace_edge:
  Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls
filter_optional_vmware:
  TargetImage|endswith: :\Windows\system32\systeminfo.exe
  SourceImage|endswith: setup64.exe
filter_optional_cylance:
  SourceImage|endswith: :\Windows\Explorer.EXE
  TargetImage|endswith: :\Program Files\Cylance\Desktop\CylanceUI.exe
filter_optional_amazon:
  SourceImage|endswith: AmazonSSMAgentSetup.exe
  TargetImage|endswith: AmazonSSMAgentSetup.exe
filter_optional_vscode:
  SourceImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe
  TargetImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe
filter_optional_teams:
  TargetImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe
  SourceImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe
filter_optional_discord:
  TargetImage|contains: \AppData\Local\Discord\
  TargetImage|endswith: \Discord.exe
filter_optional_yammer:
  SourceImage|contains: \AppData\Local\yammerdesktop\app-
  SourceImage|endswith: \Yammer.exe
  TargetImage|contains: \AppData\Local\yammerdesktop\app-
  TargetImage|endswith: \Yammer.exe
  GrantedAccess: "0x1000"
filter_optional_evernote:
  TargetImage|endswith: \Evernote\Evernote.exe
filter_optional_adobe_acrobat:
  SourceImage|contains: :\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\
  SourceImage|endswith: \AcroCEF.exe
  TargetImage|contains: :\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\
  TargetImage|endswith: \AcroCEF.exe
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Author

Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton (FP)

Created

2021-07-28

Data Sources

windowsProcess Access Events

Platforms

windows

Tags

attack.executionattack.t1106
Raw Content
title: Potential Direct Syscall of NtOpenProcess
id: 3f3f3506-1895-401b-9cc3-e86b16e630d0
status: test
description: Detects potential calls to NtOpenProcess directly from NTDLL.
references:
    - https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-direct-system-calls-and-cobalt-strike-bofs-0xff14-741fa8e1bdd6
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton (FP)
date: 2021-07-28
modified: 2023-12-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CallTrace|startswith: 'UNKNOWN'
    filter_main_vcredist:
        TargetImage|endswith: 'vcredist_x64.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith: 'vcredist_x64.exe'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Examples include "systeminfo", "backgroundTaskHost", "AUDIODG"
        SourceImage|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
        TargetImage|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
    filter_main_kerneltrace_edge:
        # Cases in which the CallTrace is just e.g. 'UNKNOWN(19290435374)' from Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls provider
        Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls'
    filter_optional_vmware:
        TargetImage|endswith: ':\Windows\system32\systeminfo.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith: 'setup64.exe' # vmware
    filter_optional_cylance:
        SourceImage|endswith: ':\Windows\Explorer.EXE'
        TargetImage|endswith: ':\Program Files\Cylance\Desktop\CylanceUI.exe'
    filter_optional_amazon:
        SourceImage|endswith: 'AmazonSSMAgentSetup.exe'
        TargetImage|endswith: 'AmazonSSMAgentSetup.exe'
    filter_optional_vscode: # VsCode
        SourceImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe'
        TargetImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe'
    filter_optional_teams: # MS Teams
        TargetImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    filter_optional_discord: # Discord
        TargetImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\Discord\'
        TargetImage|endswith: '\Discord.exe'
    filter_optional_yammer:
        SourceImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\yammerdesktop\app-'
        SourceImage|endswith: '\Yammer.exe'
        TargetImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\yammerdesktop\app-'
        TargetImage|endswith: '\Yammer.exe'
        GrantedAccess: '0x1000'
    filter_optional_evernote:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\Evernote\Evernote.exe'
    filter_optional_adobe_acrobat:
        SourceImage|contains: ':\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\'
        SourceImage|endswith: '\AcroCEF.exe'
        TargetImage|contains: ':\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\'
        TargetImage|endswith: '\AcroCEF.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium