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splunk_escuAnomaly

Potential System Network Configuration Discovery Activity

The following analytic identifies the rapid execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on an endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUIDs, names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to map the network, which is a common precursor to lateral movement or further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to gain insights into the network topology, identify critical systems, and plan subsequent attacks, potentially leading to data exfiltration or system compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count values(Processes.process) as process
        values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process
        min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

NOT Processes.user IN ("","unknown")

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product _time

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| search process_name IN (
          "arp.exe",
          "dsquery.exe",
          "hostname.exe",
          "ipconfig.exe",
          "nbstat.exe",
          "net.exe",
          "net1.exe",
          "nltest.exe",
          "netsh.exe",
          "nslookup.exe",
          "ping.exe",
          "quser.exe",
          "qwinsta.exe",
          "telnet.exe",
          "tracert.exe",
        )
| transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m
| where eventcount>=5
| `potential_system_network_configuration_discovery_activity_filter`

Author

Bhavin Patel, Splunk

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 1Windows Event Log Security 4688CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2

Tags

Unusual Processes
Raw Content
name: Potential System Network Configuration Discovery Activity
id: 3f0b95e3-3195-46ac-bea3-84fb59e7fac5
version: 7
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies the rapid execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on an endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUIDs, names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to map the network, which is a common precursor to lateral movement or further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to gain insights into the network topology, identify critical systems, and plan subsequent attacks, potentially leading to data exfiltration or system compromise.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count values(Processes.process) as process
            values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process
            min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

    NOT Processes.user IN ("","unknown")

    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
    Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
    Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
    Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
    Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
    Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product _time

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | search process_name IN (
              "arp.exe",
              "dsquery.exe",
              "hostname.exe",
              "ipconfig.exe",
              "nbstat.exe",
              "net.exe",
              "net1.exe",
              "nltest.exe",
              "netsh.exe",
              "nslookup.exe",
              "ping.exe",
              "quser.exe",
              "qwinsta.exe",
              "telnet.exe",
              "tracert.exe",
            )
    | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m
    | where eventcount>=5
    | `potential_system_network_configuration_discovery_activity_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives.
references: []
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process.
    risk_objects:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
    threat_objects:
        - field: parent_process_name
          type: parent_process_name
        - field: process_name
          type: process_name
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Unusual Processes
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1016
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog