Detect Remote Access Software Usage File

name: Detect Remote Access Software Usage File
id: 3bf5541a-6a45-4fdc-b01d-59b899fff961
version: 14
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The following analytic detects the writing of files from known remote access software to disk within the environment.
    It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on file path, file name, and user information.
    This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access.
    If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, further compromise, or complete control over affected systems.
    It is best to update both the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup and the remote_access_software lookup with any known or approved remote access software to reduce false positives and increase coverage.
    In order to enhance performance, the detection filters for specific file names extensions / names that are used in the remote_access_software lookup.
    If add additional entries, consider updating the search filters to include those file names / extensions as well, if not alread covered.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 11
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime,
            max(_time) as lastTime
            values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.file_name IN (
      "*.app",
      "*.exe",
      "*.msi",
      "*.pkg",
      "*echoware.dll",
      "*Idrive.*",
      "*rdp2tcp.py"
    )
    by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time
       Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash
       Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name
       Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size
       Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id
       Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
    | lookup remote_access_software remote_utility AS file_name OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category
    | search isutility = TRUE
    | `remote_access_software_usage_exceptions`
    | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_file_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the file path, file name, and the user that created the file. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Filesystem` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process. The "exceptions" macro leverages both an Assets and Identities lookup, as well as a KVStore collection called "remote_software_exceptions" that lets you track and maintain device-based exceptions for this set of detections.
known_false_positives: Known or approved applications used by the organization or usage of built-in functions. Known false positives can be added to the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup to globally suppress these situations across all remote access content
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: Investigate files on $dest$
      search: '| from datamodel:Endpoint.Filesystem | search dest=$dest$ file_name=$file_name$'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A file for known a remote access software [$file_name$] was created on $dest$ by $user$.
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
    threat_objects:
        - field: file_name
          type: file_name
        - field: signature
          type: signature
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Cactus Ransomware
        - CISA AA24-241A
        - Command And Control
        - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
        - Gozi Malware
        - Insider Threat
        - Interlock Ransomware
        - Ransomware
        - Remote Monitoring and Management Software
        - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
        - Scattered Spider
        - Seashell Blizzard
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1219
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
    manual_test: This detection uses A&I lookups from Enterprise Security.
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1219/screenconnect/screenconnect_sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog