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Windows Suspicious Named Pipe

The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by malicious or suspicious tools. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain privilege escalation, persistence, c2 communications, or further system compromise.

Detection Query

`sysmon`
EventCode IN (17, 18)
NOT process_path IN (
    "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*",
    "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*",
    "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*",
    "*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*",
    "*:\\Program Files\\Google*",
    "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*",
    "*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
    "*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
    "*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*",
    "*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*",
    "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*",
    "*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*",
    "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*",
    "System",
)

| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  count by dest dvc process_exec process_guid process_id process_path
           pipe_name user_id process_name signature signature_id vendor_product

| lookup suspicious_named_pipes suspicious_pipe_name AS pipe_name OUTPUT tool, type, description
| where isnotnull(tool)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_suspicious_named_pipe_filter`

Author

Raven Tait, Splunk

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 17Sysmon EventID 18
Raw Content
name: Windows Suspicious Named Pipe
id: 3a76d52f-a007-4a65-a37d-f313c2c83f31
version: 5
creation_date: '2025-12-08'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes.
    It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by malicious or suspicious tools.
    If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain privilege escalation,
    persistence, c2 communications, or further system compromise.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 17
    - Sysmon EventID 18
search: |
    `sysmon`
    EventCode IN (17, 18)
    NOT process_path IN (
        "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*",
        "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*",
        "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*",
        "*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*",
        "*:\\Program Files\\Google*",
        "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*",
        "*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
        "*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
        "*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*",
        "*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*",
        "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*",
        "*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*",
        "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*",
        "System",
    )

    | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
      count by dest dvc process_exec process_guid process_id process_path
               pipe_name user_id process_name signature signature_id vendor_product

    | lookup suspicious_named_pipes suspicious_pipe_name AS pipe_name OUTPUT tool, type, description
    | where isnotnull(tool)
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_suspicious_named_pipe_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
    logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon,
    you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: |
    False positives should be rare, investigate matches and apply additional filters as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: An instance of $process_name$ located in $process_path$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ accessing known suspicious named pipe $pipe_name$.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    - BlackByte Ransomware
    - Brute Ratel C4
    - Cobalt Strike
    - DarkSide Ransomware
    - Gozi Malware
    - Graceful Wipe Out Attack
    - Hellcat Ransomware
    - LockBit Ransomware
    - Meterpreter
    - Remote Monitoring and Management Software
    - Trickbot
    - Tuoni
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1559
    - T1021.002
    - T1055
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/named_pipes/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit