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sublimemediumRule

Suspicious recipients pattern with no Compauth pass and suspicious content

Detects messages with undisclosed recipients (likely all bcc), where the Compauth verdict is not 'pass', and ML has identified suspicious language or credential phishing links.

Detection Query

type.inbound
and (
  length(recipients.to) == 0
  or all(recipients.to, .display_name == "Undisclosed recipients")
)
and length(recipients.cc) == 0
and length(recipients.bcc) == 0
and 2 of (
  (
    any(headers.hops,
        .authentication_results.compauth.verdict is not null
        and .authentication_results.compauth.verdict not in ("pass", "softpass")
    )
  ),
  (
    any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
        .name in ("bec", "cred_theft", "advance_fee") and .confidence == "high"
    )
  ),
  (
    any(body.links,
        any([ml.link_analysis(.)],
            .credphish.disposition == "phishing"
            and .credphish.confidence in ("high")
        )
    )
  )
)
and (
  profile.by_sender().prevalence in ("new", "outlier")
  or (
    profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
    and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
  )
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)

Data Sources

Email MessagesEmail HeadersEmail Attachments

Platforms

email
Raw Content
name: "Suspicious recipients pattern with no Compauth pass and suspicious content"
description: "Detects messages with undisclosed recipients (likely all bcc), where the Compauth verdict is not 'pass', and ML has identified suspicious language or credential phishing links."
type: "rule"
severity: "medium"
source: |
  type.inbound
  and (
    length(recipients.to) == 0
    or all(recipients.to, .display_name == "Undisclosed recipients")
  )
  and length(recipients.cc) == 0
  and length(recipients.bcc) == 0
  and 2 of (
    (
      any(headers.hops,
          .authentication_results.compauth.verdict is not null
          and .authentication_results.compauth.verdict not in ("pass", "softpass")
      )
    ),
    (
      any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
          .name in ("bec", "cred_theft", "advance_fee") and .confidence == "high"
      )
    ),
    (
      any(body.links,
          any([ml.link_analysis(.)],
              .credphish.disposition == "phishing"
              and .credphish.confidence in ("high")
          )
      )
    )
  )
  and (
    profile.by_sender().prevalence in ("new", "outlier")
    or (
      profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
      and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
    )
  )
  // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
  and (
    (
      sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
      and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
    )
    or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
  )
detection_methods:
  - "Content analysis"
  - "Computer Vision"
  - "Header analysis"
  - "Natural Language Understanding"
  - "URL analysis"
  - "URL screenshot"
id: "34fb65f6-03e8-5752-b602-4f294172b5db"