Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations

[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/11/18"
integration = ["okta"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/04/10"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple sessions started from different geolocations. Adversaries may attempt to
launch an attack by using a list of known usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to user accounts from
different locations.
"""
from = "now-30m"
interval = "15m"
language = "esql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations

This rule detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple sessions started from different geolocations. Adversaries may attempt to launch an attack by using a list of known usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to user accounts from different locations.

#### Possible investigation steps:
- Since this is an ESQL rule, the `okta.actor.alternate_id` and `okta.client.id` values can be used to pivot into the raw authentication events related to this alert.
- Identify the users involved in this action by examining the `okta.actor.id`, `okta.actor.type`, `okta.actor.alternate_id`, and `okta.actor.display_name` fields.
- Determine the device client used for these actions by analyzing `okta.client.ip`, `okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent`, `okta.client.zone`, `okta.client.device`, and `okta.client.id` fields.
- With Okta end users identified, review the `okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash` field.
    - Historical analysis should indicate if this device token hash is commonly associated with the user.
- Review the `okta.event_type` field to determine the type of authentication event that occurred.
    - If the event type is `user.authentication.sso`, the user may have legitimately started a session via a proxy for security or privacy reasons.
    - If the event type is `user.authentication.password`, the user may be using a proxy to access multiple accounts for password spraying.
    - If the event type is `user.session.start`, the source may have attempted to establish a session via the Okta authentication API.
- Review the past activities of the actor(s) involved in this action by checking their previous actions.
- Evaluate the actions that happened just before and after this event in the `okta.event_type` field to help understand the full context of the activity.
    - This may help determine the authentication and authorization actions that occurred between the user, Okta and application.

### False positive analysis:
- It is very rare that a legitimate user would have multiple sessions started from different geo-located countries in a short time frame.

### Response and remediation:
- If the user is legitimate and the authentication behavior is not suspicious based on device analysis, no action is required.
- If the user is legitimate but the authentication behavior is suspicious, consider resetting passwords for the users involves and enabling multi-factor authentication (MFA).
    - If MFA is already enabled, consider resetting MFA for the users.
- If any of the users are not legitimate, consider deactivating the user's account.
- Conduct a review of Okta policies and ensure they are in accordance with security best practices.
- Check with internal IT teams to determine if the accounts involved recently had MFA reset at the request of the user.
    - If so, confirm with the user this was a legitimate request.
    - If so and this was not a legitimate request, consider deactivating the user's account temporarily.
        - Reset passwords and reset MFA for the user.
- If this is a false positive, consider adding the `okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash` field to the `exceptions` list in the rule.
    - This will prevent future occurrences of this event for this device from triggering the rule.
    - Alternatively adding `okta.client.ip` or a CIDR range to the `exceptions` list can prevent future occurrences of this event from triggering the rule.
        - This should be done with caution as it may prevent legitimate alerts from being generated.
"""
references = [
    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/",
    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/",
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy",
    "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection",
    "https://www.rezonate.io/blog/okta-logs-decoded-unveiling-identity-threats-through-threat-hunting/",
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/monitoring-okta-threats-with-elastic-security",
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/starter-guide-to-understanding-okta",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "2e56e1bc-867a-11ee-b13e-f661ea17fbcd"
setup = "The Okta Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
    "Data Source: Okta",
    "Tactic: Initial Access",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "esql"

query = '''
from logs-okta*
| where
    data_stream.dataset == "okta.system" and
    (event.action like "user.authentication.*" or event.action == "user.session.start") and
    okta.security_context.is_proxy != true and
    okta.actor.id != "unknown" and
    event.outcome == "success"
| keep
    event.action,
    okta.security_context.is_proxy,
    okta.actor.id,
    okta.actor.alternate_id,
    event.outcome,
    client.geo.country_name
| stats
    Esql.client_geo_country_name_count_distinct = count_distinct(client.geo.country_name)
    by okta.actor.id, okta.actor.alternate_id
| where
    Esql.client_geo_country_name_count_distinct >= 2
| sort
    Esql.client_geo_country_name_count_distinct desc
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1078.004"
name = "Cloud Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"