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sublimehighRule

Employee impersonation: Payroll fraud

This rule detects messages impersonating employees, from unsolicited senders attempting to reroute payroll or alter payment details.

MITRE ATT&CK

initial-access

Detection Query

type.inbound

// ensure the display name contains a space to avoid single named process accounts eg. 'billing, payment'
and strings.contains(sender.display_name, " ")
and sender.display_name in~ $org_display_names
and length(attachments) == 0
and length(body.links) < 10
and length(body.current_thread.text) < 800
and (
  sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain in $free_email_providers
)
and 1 of (
  regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
                  '(?:pay\s?(?:roll|check|date|day)|direct deposit|(?:acct|account) rephrase|paid.{0,50}problems|\bACH\b|\bdd\b|gehalt|salario|salary|employee self[-\s]?service|\bESS\b.{0,30}(?:portal|access|log[-\s]?in)|access.{0,30}(?:HR|employee).{0,30}portal)'
  ),
  regex.icontains(subject.subject,
                  '(?:pay\s?(?:roll|check|date|day)|direct deposit|(?:acct|account) rephrase|paid.{0,50}problems|\bACH\b|\bdd\b|gehalt|salario|salary|employee self[-\s]?service|\bESS\b.{0,15}portal)'
  )
)
and (
  not profile.by_sender_email().solicited
  or profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
)
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign

// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and (
      any(distinct(headers.hops, .authentication_results.dmarc is not null),
          strings.ilike(.authentication_results.dmarc, "*fail")
      )
    )
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)

Data Sources

Email MessagesEmail HeadersEmail Attachments

Platforms

email
Raw Content
name: "Employee impersonation: Payroll fraud"
description: |
  This rule detects messages impersonating employees, from unsolicited senders attempting to reroute payroll
  or alter payment details.
type: "rule"
severity: "high"
source: |
  type.inbound

  // ensure the display name contains a space to avoid single named process accounts eg. 'billing, payment'
  and strings.contains(sender.display_name, " ")
  and sender.display_name in~ $org_display_names
  and length(attachments) == 0
  and length(body.links) < 10
  and length(body.current_thread.text) < 800
  and (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
    or sender.email.domain.root_domain in $free_email_providers
  )
  and 1 of (
    regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
                    '(?:pay\s?(?:roll|check|date|day)|direct deposit|(?:acct|account) rephrase|paid.{0,50}problems|\bACH\b|\bdd\b|gehalt|salario|salary|employee self[-\s]?service|\bESS\b.{0,30}(?:portal|access|log[-\s]?in)|access.{0,30}(?:HR|employee).{0,30}portal)'
    ),
    regex.icontains(subject.subject,
                    '(?:pay\s?(?:roll|check|date|day)|direct deposit|(?:acct|account) rephrase|paid.{0,50}problems|\bACH\b|\bdd\b|gehalt|salario|salary|employee self[-\s]?service|\bESS\b.{0,15}portal)'
    )
  )
  and (
    not profile.by_sender_email().solicited
    or profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
  )
  and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
  
  // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
  and (
    (
      sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
      and (
        any(distinct(headers.hops, .authentication_results.dmarc is not null),
            strings.ilike(.authentication_results.dmarc, "*fail")
        )
      )
    )
    or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
  )

attack_types:
  - "BEC/Fraud"
tactics_and_techniques:
  - "Impersonation: Employee"
  - "Free email provider"
  - "Social engineering"
detection_methods:
  - "Content analysis"
  - "Sender analysis"
id: "2beb7d85-dfe3-5ecc-9b2a-d7416a3ef992"