EXPLORE
← Back to Explore
splunk_escuTTP

Windows Group Policy Object Created

The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) by leveraging Event IDs 5136 and 5137. This detection uses directory service change events to identify when a new GPO is created. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, leading to widespread compromise and significant operational disruption.

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection Query

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR (EventCode=5136 AttributeValue!="New Group Policy Object" AND (AttributeLDAPDisplayName=displayName OR AttributeLDAPDisplayName=gPCFileSysPath) ) ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer
  | stats values(AttributeValue) as details values(SubjectUserSid) as User values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN
    BY ObjectGUID Computer dest
  | eval GPO_Name = mvindex(details, 0)
  | eval GPO_Path = mvindex(details, 1)
  | fields - details
  | `windows_group_policy_object_created_filter`

Author

Mauricio Velazco

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Windows Event Log Security 5136Windows Event Log Security 5137

Tags

Active Directory Privilege EscalationSneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
Raw Content
name: Windows Group Policy Object Created
id: 23add2a8-ea22-4fd4-8bc0-8c0b822373a1
version: 10
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Mauricio Velazco
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 5136
    - Windows Event Log Security 5137
description: The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) by leveraging Event IDs 5136 and 5137. This detection uses directory service change events to identify when a new GPO is created. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, leading to widespread compromise and significant operational disruption.
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR (EventCode=5136 AttributeValue!="New Group Policy Object" AND (AttributeLDAPDisplayName=displayName OR AttributeLDAPDisplayName=gPCFileSysPath) ) ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer
      | stats values(AttributeValue) as details values(SubjectUserSid) as User values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN
        BY ObjectGUID Computer dest
      | eval GPO_Name = mvindex(details, 0)
      | eval GPO_Path = mvindex(details, 1)
      | fields - details
      | `windows_group_policy_object_created_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, the Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Directory Service Changes` within `DS Access` needs to be enabled. Furthermore, the appropriate system access control lists (SACL) need to be created as the used events are not logged by default. A good guide to accomplish this can be found here https://jgspiers.com/audit-group-policy-changes/.
known_false_positives: Group Policy Objects are created as part of regular administrative operations, filter as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/weaponizing-group-policy-objects-access/
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lockbit-ransomware-now-encrypts-windows-domains-using-group-policies/
    - https://www.varonis.com/blog/group-policy-objects
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$User$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  User = "$User$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$User$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$User$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A new group policy objected was created by $User$
    risk_objects:
        - field: User
          type: user
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
        - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1078.002
        - T1484.001
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484.001/group_policy_created/windows-security.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog