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splunk_escuTTP
Linux Magic SysRq Key Abuse
Detects potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges to manipulate or destabilize a system. Writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger can crash the system, kill processes, or bypass standard logging. Monitoring SysRq abuse helps detect stealthy post-exploitation activity. Correlate with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
Detection Query
`linux_auditd`
(type=PATH OR type=CWD)
| rex "msg=audit\([^)]*:(?<audit_id>\d+)\)"
| stats
values(type) as types
values(name) as names
values(nametype) as nametype
values(cwd) as cwd_list
values(_time) as event_times
by audit_id, host
| eval current_working_directory = coalesce(mvindex(cwd_list, 0), "N/A")
| eval candidate_paths = mvmap(names, if(match(names, "^/"), names, current_working_directory + "/" + names))
| eval matched_paths = mvfilter(match(candidate_paths, ".*/proc/sysrq-trigger|.*/proc/sys/kernel/sysrq|.*/etc/sysctl.conf"))
| eval match_count = mvcount(matched_paths)
| eval reconstructed_path = mvindex(matched_paths, 0)
| eval e_time = mvindex(event_times, 0)
| where match_count > 0
| rename host as dest
| stats count min(e_time) as firstTime max(e_time) as lastTime
values(nametype) as nametype
by current_working_directory
reconstructed_path
match_count
dest
audit_id
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_magic_sysrq_key_abuse_filter`
Author
Milad Cheraghi
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Linux Auditd PathLinux Auditd Cwd
References
Tags
Compromised Linux Host
Raw Content
name: Linux Magic SysRq Key Abuse
id: 22c03600-f84a-47fa-abaa-ffbe3e72c782
version: 3
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Milad Cheraghi
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
Detects potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges to manipulate or destabilize a system.
Writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger can crash the system, kill processes, or bypass standard logging.
Monitoring SysRq abuse helps detect stealthy post-exploitation activity.
Correlate with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
data_source:
- Linux Auditd Path
- Linux Auditd Cwd
search: |
`linux_auditd`
(type=PATH OR type=CWD)
| rex "msg=audit\([^)]*:(?<audit_id>\d+)\)"
| stats
values(type) as types
values(name) as names
values(nametype) as nametype
values(cwd) as cwd_list
values(_time) as event_times
by audit_id, host
| eval current_working_directory = coalesce(mvindex(cwd_list, 0), "N/A")
| eval candidate_paths = mvmap(names, if(match(names, "^/"), names, current_working_directory + "/" + names))
| eval matched_paths = mvfilter(match(candidate_paths, ".*/proc/sysrq-trigger|.*/proc/sys/kernel/sysrq|.*/etc/sysctl.conf"))
| eval match_count = mvcount(matched_paths)
| eval reconstructed_path = mvindex(matched_paths, 0)
| eval e_time = mvindex(event_times, 0)
| where match_count > 0
| rename host as dest
| stats count min(e_time) as firstTime max(e_time) as lastTime
values(nametype) as nametype
by current_working_directory
reconstructed_path
match_count
dest
audit_id
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_magic_sysrq_key_abuse_filter`
how_to_implement: |
To implement this detection, ensure auditd is configured to watch:
- /proc/sysrq-trigger
- /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq
- /etc/sysctl.conf
with write and attribute changes (`-p wa`) and key `sysrq`. Make sure the type=CWD record type is activate in your auditd configuration and
Use the Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux for proper ingestion and CIM normalization.
This enables effective monitoring of Linux endpoints for SysRq abuse.
known_false_positives: |
Legitimate administrative activity modifying SysRq for debugging or recovery.
Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
- https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.10/_sources/admin-guide/sysrq.txt
- https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/4/html/reference_guide/s3-proc-sys-kernel
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-awfulshred-script-wiper.html
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest="$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: Abuse of the Linux Magic System Request key detected on host - [$dest$]
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Compromised Linux Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059.004
- T1529
- T1489
- T1499
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1529/auditd_path_sysrq/path_sysrq.log
source: auditd
sourcetype: auditd