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Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Command

The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks designed to execute commands using native Windows shells like PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, or Cscript or from public folders such as Users, Temp, or ProgramData. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, enabled, or modified. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.

MITRE ATT&CK

executionpersistenceprivilege-escalation

Detection Query

`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)
| eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)
| xmlkv TaskContent
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, Caller_User_Name, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden, EventCode
| lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_command as Command 
| where tool == "shell command use" OR tool == "suspicious paths"
| eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments)," ".Arguments,""), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer, signature_id = EventCode 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_command_filter` 

Author

Steven Dick

Created

2026-03-10

Data Sources

Windows Event Log Security 4698Windows Event Log Security 4700Windows Event Log Security 4702

Tags

SolarWinds WHD RCE Post ExploitationScheduled TasksRansomwareQuasar RATRyuk RansomwareWindows Persistence TechniquesSeashell BlizzardAPT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
Raw Content
name: Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Command
id: 1f44c126-c26a-4dd3-83bb-0f9a0f03ecc3
version: 7
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks designed to execute commands using native Windows shells like PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, or Cscript or from public folders such as Users, Temp, or ProgramData. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, enabled, or modified. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4698
    - Windows Event Log Security 4700
    - Windows Event Log Security 4702
search: "`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)\n| eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)\n| xmlkv TaskContent\n| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, Caller_User_Name, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden, EventCode\n| lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_command as Command \n| where tool == \"shell command use\" OR tool == \"suspicious paths\"\n| eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments),\" \".Arguments,\"\"), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer, signature_id = EventCode \n| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` \n| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`\n| `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_command_filter` "
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately. Windows Defender, Google Chrome, and MS Edge updates may trigger this detection.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
    - https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2023/231213.pdf
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/11/06/bengal-cat-lovers-in-australia-get-psspsspssd-in-google-driven-gootloader-campaign/
    - https://github.com/mthcht/awesome-lists/blob/main/Lists/suspicious_windows_tasks_list.csv
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$","$user$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: Investigate schedule tasks on $dest$
      search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702) Computer="$dest$" Caller_User_Name="$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A suspicious windows scheduled task named [$TaskName$] was detected on $dest$, this may be an indicator of [$tool$]
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
    threat_objects:
        - field: Command
          type: signature
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - SolarWinds WHD RCE Post Exploitation
        - Scheduled Tasks
        - Ransomware
        - Quasar RAT
        - Ryuk Ransomware
        - Windows Persistence Techniques
        - Seashell Blizzard
        - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1053.005
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog