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sigmamediumHunting
Diskshadow Script Mode - Uncommon Script Extension Execution
Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode to execute an script with a potentially uncommon extension. Initial baselining of the allowed extension list is required.
Detection Query
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: diskshadow.exe
- Image|endswith: \diskshadow.exe
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains|windash: "-s "
filter_main_ext:
CommandLine|contains: .txt
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Created
2023-09-15
Data Sources
windowsProcess Creation Events
Platforms
windows
References
- https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
- https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow
- https://www.lifars.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/GriefRansomware_Whitepaper-2.pdf
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/evilplayout-attack-against-irans-state-broadcaster/
Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1218
Raw Content
title: Diskshadow Script Mode - Uncommon Script Extension Execution
id: 1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f
related:
- id: fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1 # Diskshadow Script Mode - Execution From Potential Suspicious Location
type: similar
- id: 9f546b25-5f12-4c8d-8532-5893dcb1e4b8 # Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of DiskShadow.EXE
type: similar
- id: 56b1dde8-b274-435f-a73a-fb75eb81262a # Diskshadow Child Process Spawned
type: similar
- id: 0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-9897-7e0768f13ff2 # Diskshadow Script Mode Execution
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode to execute an script with a potentially uncommon extension.
Initial baselining of the allowed extension list is required.
references:
- https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
- https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow
- https://www.lifars.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/GriefRansomware_Whitepaper-2.pdf
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/evilplayout-attack-against-irans-state-broadcaster/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'diskshadow.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\diskshadow.exe'
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s '
filter_main_ext:
# Note: can be changed to an "endswith" to avoid rare FPs. But you need to account for quoted paths
# Note: Using the ".txt" is based on the MS documentation example. Best add the extension you use internally before using this rule
CommandLine|contains: '.txt'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- False postitve might occur with legitimate or uncommon extensions used internally. Initial baseline is required.
level: medium