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sigmahighTTP
Suspicious Double Extension File Execution
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spear phishing campaigns
Detection Query
selection:
Image|endswith:
- " .exe"
- ______.exe
- .doc.exe
- .doc.js
- .docx.exe
- .docx.js
- .gif.exe
- .jpeg.exe
- .jpg.exe
- .mkv.exe
- .mov.exe
- .mp3.exe
- .mp4.exe
- .pdf.exe
- .pdf.js
- .png.exe
- .ppt.exe
- .ppt.js
- .pptx.exe
- .pptx.js
- .rtf.exe
- .rtf.js
- .svg.exe
- .txt.exe
- .txt.js
- .xls.exe
- .xls.js
- .xlsx.exe
- .xlsx.js
- ⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- " .exe"
- ______.exe
- .doc.exe
- .doc.js
- .docx.exe
- .docx.js
- .gif.exe
- .jpeg.exe
- .jpg.exe
- .mkv.exe
- .mov.exe
- .mp3.exe
- .mp4.exe
- .pdf.exe
- .pdf.js
- .png.exe
- .ppt.exe
- .ppt.js
- .pptx.exe
- .pptx.js
- .rtf.exe
- .rtf.js
- .svg.exe
- .txt.exe
- .txt.js
- .xls.exe
- .xls.js
- .xlsx.exe
- .xlsx.js
- ⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe
condition: selection
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @blu3_team (idea), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Created
2019-06-26
Data Sources
windowsProcess Creation Events
Platforms
windows
References
Tags
attack.initial-accessattack.t1566.001
Raw Content
title: Suspicious Double Extension File Execution
id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8
related:
- id: 5e6a80c8-2d45-4633-9ef4-fa2671a39c5c # ParentImage/ParentCommandLine
type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spear phishing campaigns
references:
- https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/06/misleading-extensions-xlsexe-docexe.html
- https://twitter.com/blackorbird/status/1140519090961825792
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cybercriminals-weaponize-fake-ai-websites
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @blu3_team (idea), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-06-26
modified: 2025-05-30
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- ' .exe'
- '______.exe'
- '.doc.exe'
- '.doc.js'
- '.docx.exe'
- '.docx.js'
- '.gif.exe'
- '.jpeg.exe'
- '.jpg.exe'
- '.mkv.exe'
- '.mov.exe'
- '.mp3.exe'
- '.mp4.exe'
- '.pdf.exe'
- '.pdf.js'
- '.png.exe'
- '.ppt.exe'
- '.ppt.js'
- '.pptx.exe'
- '.pptx.js'
- '.rtf.exe'
- '.rtf.js'
- '.svg.exe'
- '.txt.exe'
- '.txt.js'
- '.xls.exe'
- '.xls.js'
- '.xlsx.exe'
- '.xlsx.js'
- '⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe' # Unicode Space Character: Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
CommandLine|contains:
- ' .exe'
- '______.exe'
- '.doc.exe'
- '.doc.js'
- '.docx.exe'
- '.docx.js'
- '.gif.exe'
- '.jpeg.exe'
- '.jpg.exe'
- '.mkv.exe'
- '.mov.exe'
- '.mp3.exe'
- '.mp4.exe'
- '.pdf.exe'
- '.pdf.js'
- '.png.exe'
- '.ppt.exe'
- '.ppt.js'
- '.pptx.exe'
- '.pptx.js'
- '.rtf.exe'
- '.rtf.js'
- '.svg.exe'
- '.txt.exe'
- '.txt.js'
- '.xls.exe'
- '.xls.js'
- '.xlsx.exe'
- '.xlsx.js'
- '⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe' # Unicode Space Character: Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high