Windows AD Short Lived Server Object

name: Windows AD Short Lived Server Object
id: 193769d3-1e33-43a9-970e-ad4a88256cdb
version: 10
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
type: TTP
status: production
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 5137
    - Windows Event Log Security 5141
description: The following analytic identifies the creation and quick deletion of a Domain Controller (DC) object within 30 seconds in an Active Directory environment, indicative of a potential DCShadow attack. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5137 and 5141, analyzing the duration between these events. This activity is significant as DCShadow allows attackers with privileged access to register a rogue DC, enabling unauthorized changes to AD objects, including credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized AD modifications, compromising the integrity and security of the entire domain.
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR EventCode=5141 ObjectDN="*CN=Servers,CN=Default-First-Site-Name,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration*"
      | transaction ObjectDN startswith=(EventCode=5137) endswith=(EventCode=5141)
      | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),"TRUE")
      | search short_lived = TRUE
      | stats values(ObjectDN) values(signature) values(EventCode)
        BY _time, Computer, SubjectUserName,
           dest
      | `windows_ad_short_lived_server_object_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you ned to be ingesting Event codes `5137` and `5141`. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Directory Services Changes` within `DS Access` needs to be enabled. For these event codes to be generated, specific SACLs are required.
known_false_positives: Creating and deleting a server object within 30 seconds or less is unusual but not impossible in a production environment. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://www.dcshadow.com/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207/
    - https://stealthbits.com/blog/detecting-dcshadow-with-event-logs/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2018/04/16/dcshadow/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5137
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5141
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$Computer$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  Computer = "$Computer$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$Computer$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$Computer$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: A short-lived server object was created and deleted on $Computer$
    risk_objects:
        - field: Computer
          type: system
          score: 50
        - field: SubjectUserName
          type: user
          score: 50
    threat_objects: []
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Compromised Windows Host
        - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1207
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1207/short_lived_server_object/windows-security.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog