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ESXi Host Logs Deleted with rm
Detects a shell `rm` of a path under `/var/log` or of a `*.log` name. Those files hold shell commands, authentication, and hostd activity. Removing them takes away the record of what changed on the host.
Detection Query
data_stream.dataset:vsphere.log and event.module:vsphere and message:(rm and ("*.log" or "/var/log/*"))
Author
Elastic
Created
2026/09/30
Data Sources
VMware vSpherelogs-vsphere.log-*
References
Tags
Domain: EndpointData Source: VMware vSphereUse Case: Threat DetectionTactic: Defense EvasionResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Platform: VMware ESXi
Raw Content
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/09/30"
integration = ["vsphere"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/09/30"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects a shell `rm` of a path under `/var/log` or of a `*.log` name. Those files hold shell commands,
authentication, and hostd activity. Removing them takes away the record of what changed on the host.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
An administrator deletes a rotated log under `/var/log` during a documented maintenance window.
Confirm the path and the change ticket.
""",
]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-vsphere.log-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "ESXi Host Logs Deleted with rm"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating ESXi Host Logs Deleted with rm
shell.log records the typed command. The rule matches a line that contains rm together with a /var/log/ path or a *.log name, such as [root]: rm -f /var/log/hostd.log or [root]: rm *.log.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Read message and note the path that was deleted.
- On the host, list /var/log and see which files are missing, including shell.log, auth.log, and hostd.log.
- Review account changes, firewall changes, and VM power events from the same session that are still in the index.
### False positive analysis
Deleting one rotated log during maintenance can be expected. rm *.log removes every log name in the current directory and should be explained by a ticket.
### Response and remediation
- If the delete was not approved, isolate the host and preserve any remaining logs before they rotate.
- Rotate credentials used in that shell session.
- Confirm remote syslog still has a copy of the deleted host logs.
"""
references = [
"https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/#",
"https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/10/esxi-targeting-ransomware-tactics-and-techniques-part-2.html",
"https://detect.fyi/vmware-esxi-logging-detection-opportunities-4fb56411ec21",
]
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires ESXi host logs collected by the Elastic vSphere integration: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/vsphere
"""
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "15db4d31-a54f-5837-8f77-a350382faac5"
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"Data Source: VMware vSphere",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
"Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL)",
"Platform: VMware ESXi",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
data_stream.dataset:vsphere.log and event.module:vsphere and message:(rm and ("*.log" or "/var/log/*"))
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1070"
name = "Indicator Removal"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1070.002"
name = "Clear Linux or Mac System Logs"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1070.004"
name = "File Deletion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
"@timestamp",
"message",
"event.original",
"host.hostname",
"log.file.path",
]