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ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell
The following analytic detects the use of `powershell.exe` to query the domain for Service Principal Names (SPNs) using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104. It identifies the use of the KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block, which is equivalent to using setspn.exe. This activity is significant as it often precedes kerberoasting or silver ticket attacks, which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this information to escalate privileges or persist within the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Created
2026-03-10
Data Sources
Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
References
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220212163642/https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
- https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
- https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
- https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
Tags
Hellcat RansomwareActive Directory DiscoveryActive Directory Kerberos AttacksMalicious PowerShellActive Directory Privilege Escalation
Raw Content
name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell
id: 13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122
version: 11
date: '2026-03-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of `powershell.exe` to query the domain for Service Principal Names (SPNs) using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104. It identifies the use of the KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block, which is equivalent to using setspn.exe. This activity is significant as it often precedes kerberoasting or silver ticket attacks, which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this information to escalate privileges or persist within the environment.
data_source:
- Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220212163642/https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
- https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
- https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
- https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user_id$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user_id = "$user_id$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user_id$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user_id$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: An instance of attempting to identify service principle detected on $dest$ names.
risk_objects:
- field: user_id
type: user
score: 50
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Hellcat Ransomware
- Active Directory Discovery
- Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
- Malicious PowerShell
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1558.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/sbl_xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog