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splunk_escuAnomaly

Windows NetSupport RMM DLL Loaded By Uncommon Process

The following analytic detects the loading of specific dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) associated with the NetSupport Remote Manager (RMM) tool by any process on a Windows system. Modules such as CryptPak.dll, HTCTL32.DLL, IPCTL32.DLL, keyshowhook.dll, pcicapi.DLL, PCICL32.DLL, and TCCTL32.DLL, are integral to NetSupport's functionality. This detection is particularly valuable when these modules are loaded by processes running from unusual directories (e.g., Downloads, ProgramData, or user-specific folders) rather than the legitimate Program Files installation path, or by executables that have been renamed but retain the internal "client32" identifier. This helps to identify instances where the legitimate NetSupport tool is being misused by adversaries as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).

MITRE ATT&CK

defense-evasion

Detection Query

`sysmon`
EventCode=7
ImageLoaded IN (
  "*\\CryptPak.dll",
  "*\\HTCTL32.DLL",
  "*\\pcicapi.dll",
  "*\\pcichek.dll",
  "*\\PCICL32.DLL",
  "*\\TCCTL32.DLL"
)
NOT Image IN ("C:\\Program Files\\*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*")
Signature = "NetSupport Ltd*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec
     process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists
     service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_netsupport_rmm_dll_loaded_by_uncommon_process_filter`

Author

Teoderick Contreras, Splunk

Created

2026-04-15

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 7

Tags

NetSupport RMM Tool Abuse
Raw Content
name: Windows NetSupport RMM DLL Loaded By Uncommon Process
id: 125f96f9-6f34-418b-b868-c4a8d7fb865f
version: 3
date: '2026-04-15'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The following analytic detects the loading of specific dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) associated with the NetSupport Remote Manager (RMM) tool by any process on a Windows system.
    Modules such as CryptPak.dll, HTCTL32.DLL, IPCTL32.DLL, keyshowhook.dll, pcicapi.DLL, PCICL32.DLL, and TCCTL32.DLL, are integral to NetSupport's functionality.
    This detection is particularly valuable when these modules are loaded by processes running from unusual directories (e.g., Downloads, ProgramData, or user-specific folders) rather than the legitimate Program Files installation path, or by executables that have been renamed but retain the internal "client32" identifier.
    This helps to identify instances where the legitimate NetSupport tool is being misused by adversaries as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 7
search: |
    `sysmon`
    EventCode=7
    ImageLoaded IN (
      "*\\CryptPak.dll",
      "*\\HTCTL32.DLL",
      "*\\pcicapi.dll",
      "*\\pcichek.dll",
      "*\\PCICL32.DLL",
      "*\\TCCTL32.DLL"
    )
    NOT Image IN ("C:\\Program Files\\*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*")
    Signature = "NetSupport Ltd*"
    | fillnull
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
      by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec
         process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists
         service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_netsupport_rmm_dll_loaded_by_uncommon_process_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded executions from your endpoints.
    If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: |
    NetSupport RMM installations outside of the standard Program Files directory will trigger this detection.
    Apply appropriate filters to exclude known legitimate installations.
references:
    - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_cybersecurity-incidentresponse-dfir-activity-7394805779448418304-g0gZ?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAuFTjIB5weY_kcyu4qp3kHbI4v49tO0zEk
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://www.esentire.com/blog/evalusion-campaign-delivers-amatera-stealer-and-netsupport-rat
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
rba:
    message: The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $dest$
    risk_objects:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
    threat_objects:
        - field: Image
          type: process_name
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - NetSupport RMM Tool Abuse
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1036
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/netsupport_modules/net_support_module.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog