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elasticcriticalTTP
Anthropic Organization Deletion
Organization deletion and bulk delete remove tenant data, projects, and member access in a single administrative action. An attacker can use this to break AI-assisted workflows as an impact technique, to extort the organization, or to destroy evidence after finishing a data export. Once deletion progresses, recovery options shrink and earlier exfiltration activity is harder to reconstruct from the tenant itself.
Detection Query
from logs-anthropic.audit-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| where
data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
mv_contains(event.category, "configuration") and
event.action in ("org_deletion_requested", "org_bulk_delete_initiated", "org_deleted_via_bulk")
| keep _id, _version, _index, @timestamp, event.*, organization.*, user.*, source.*, user_agent.*, anthropic.audit.*, data_stream.*
Author
Elastic
Created
2026/09/12
Data Sources
Anthropic Audit Logs
Tags
Domain: GenAIPlatform: AnthropicData Source: Anthropic Audit LogsUse Case: Threat DetectionResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLTactic: Impact
Raw Content
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/09/12"
integration = ["anthropic"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/09/25"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Organization deletion and bulk delete remove tenant data, projects, and member access in a single administrative action.
An attacker can use this to break AI-assisted workflows as an impact technique, to extort the organization, or to
destroy evidence after finishing a data export. Once deletion progresses, recovery options shrink and earlier
exfiltration activity is harder to reconstruct from the tenant itself.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
Planned tenant offboarding, sandbox teardown, or contract termination can produce these events. Confirm the actor
and timing against change management or offboarding records before escalating.
""",
]
from = "now-9m"
language = "esql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Anthropic Organization Deletion"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating Anthropic Organization Deletion
Organization deletion / bulk delete removes tenant data, projects, and member access. Treat early actions as urgent —
recovery options shrink as the workflow progresses.
Unauthorized = no offboarding / lab-teardown ticket naming this org and actor, or deletion preceded by owner transfer,
admin grants, key creation, or data exports without a matching business project.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Identify actor (`user_actor` → email/IP/UA) and `organization.id`.
- Urgency by action:
- `org_deletion_requested`: intervene immediately if unauthorized.
- `org_bulk_delete_initiated`: bulk delete started — escalate IR now.
- `org_deleted_via_bulk`: completed — prioritize evidence preservation outside the tenant.
- Look for preceding primary owner transfer, admin grants, admin API key creation, or data exports.
- Close as FP only when platform owners confirm scheduled decommission with matching ticket/time/actor.
### False positive analysis
- Sandbox teardown and contract termination are valid — require change management or offboarding records.
### Response and remediation
- On unauthorized activity: engage Anthropic support and internal IR immediately, preserve remaining audit logs
(including prior exports), and rotate administrative credentials for the organization.
"""
references = ["https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/compliance/activities/list"]
risk_score = 99
rule_id = "11347993-e71f-4659-a903-e9a0e8bd55de"
severity = "critical"
tags = [
"Domain: GenAI",
"Platform: Anthropic",
"Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
"Rule Type: ES|QL",
"Tactic: Impact",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "esql"
query = '''
from logs-anthropic.audit-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| where
data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
mv_contains(event.category, "configuration") and
event.action in ("org_deletion_requested", "org_bulk_delete_initiated", "org_deleted_via_bulk")
| keep _id, _version, _index, @timestamp, event.*, organization.*, user.*, source.*, user_agent.*, anthropic.audit.*, data_stream.*
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1485"
name = "Data Destruction"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1531"
name = "Account Access Removal"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0040"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
[[rule.threat_mappings]]
framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
version = "2026.08"
[[rule.threat_mappings.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
[rule.threat_mappings.threat.tactic]
id = "AML.TA0011"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/tactics/AML.TA0011/"
[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
"@timestamp",
"event.action",
"event.id",
"organization.id",
"anthropic.audit.actor.type",
"user.email",
"user.id",
"source.ip",
"user_agent.original",
]