Anthropic Excessive Chat Snapshot Creation

[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/09/16"
integration = ["anthropic"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/09/25"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects an unusually high number of successful Claude chat snapshot creation events for the same user email within a
rolling 24-hour window. Chat snapshots package conversation content into shareable exports; sustained creation volume
can indicate staging of organizational chat data for exfiltration via Anthropic's web service or automated bulk export
of sensitive prompts and responses.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Power users, trainers, or documentation owners who intentionally snapshot many chats for sharing, archival, or
    handoff workflows can exceed the threshold without malicious intent.
    """,
]
from = "now-24h"
interval = "1h"
language = "esql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Anthropic Excessive Chat Snapshot Creation"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Anthropic Excessive Chat Snapshot Creation

One mailbox created many chat snapshots in 24 hours. Snapshots can package conversation content for handoff — or for
exfiltration staging. Source IP/UA are investigation fields, not grouping keys, so multi-IP bursts still accumulate.

Escalate when scripting UA, concurrent file uploads / public artifact sharing / data exports / chat deletions appear,
or snapshots span many unrelated chats. Close as FP for documented knowledge handoffs, training packaging, or
compliance archival automation.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Review event count and snapshot/chat ID lists — many distinct chats is stronger than repeated snapshots of one chat.
- Inspect IP/UA values for automation. Correlate with uploads, public artifact sharing, exports, or deletions from
  the same email.
- Note actor type and whether the same email appears across organizations (`organization_id` values).

### False positive analysis

- Power-user archival and compliance snapshot jobs commonly exceed the threshold.

### Response and remediation

- On unauthorized staging: revoke sessions, review snapshot destinations and shared links, and tighten chat sharing
  or export policy for the actor.
"""
references = ["https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/compliance/activities/list"]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "0cd6c462-28eb-482a-b445-9ced6a034b49"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Domain: GenAI",
    "Platform: Anthropic",
    "Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Use Case: UEBA",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
    "Rule Type: ES|QL",
    "Tactic: Exfiltration",
    "Mitre Atlas: AML.T0085",
    "Mitre Atlas: AML.T0025",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "esql"

query = '''
from logs-anthropic.audit-*
| where
    data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
    mv_contains(event.category, "file") and
    event.action == "claude_chat_snapshot_created" and
    event.outcome == "success" and
    user.email is not null
| stats
    Esql.event_count = count(*),
    Esql.event_id_values = values(event.id),
    Esql.anthropic_audit_claude_chat_snapshot_id_values = values(anthropic.audit.claude_chat_snapshot_id),
    Esql.anthropic_audit_claude_chat_id_values = values(anthropic.audit.claude_chat_id),
    Esql.source_ip_values = values(source.ip),
    Esql.user_agent_original_values = values(user_agent.original),
    Esql.anthropic_audit_actor_type_values = values(anthropic.audit.actor.type),
    Esql.organization_id_values = values(organization.id),
    Esql.user_id_values = values(user.id),
    Esql.timestamp_first_seen = min(@timestamp),
    Esql.timestamp_last_seen = max(@timestamp)
  by user.email
| where Esql.event_count >= 10
| keep user.email, Esql.*
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1567"
name = "Exfiltration Over Web Service"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0010"
name = "Exfiltration"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"
[[rule.threat_mappings]]
framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
version = "2026.08"
[[rule.threat_mappings.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
[[rule.threat_mappings.threat.technique]]
id = "AML.T0085"
name = "Data from AI Services"
reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0085/"


[rule.threat_mappings.threat.tactic]
id = "AML.TA0009"
name = "Collection"
reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/tactics/AML.TA0009/"
[[rule.threat_mappings.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
[[rule.threat_mappings.threat.technique]]
id = "AML.T0025"
name = "Exfiltration via Cyber Means"
reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0025/"


[rule.threat_mappings.threat.tactic]
id = "AML.TA0010"
name = "Exfiltration"
reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/tactics/AML.TA0010/"

[rule.alert_suppression]
group_by = ["user.email"]
missing_fields_strategy = "suppress"

[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
    "user.email",
    "Esql.event_count",
    "Esql.event_id_values",
    "Esql.anthropic_audit_claude_chat_snapshot_id_values",
    "Esql.anthropic_audit_claude_chat_id_values",
    "Esql.source_ip_values",
    "Esql.user_agent_original_values",
    "Esql.anthropic_audit_actor_type_values",
    "Esql.organization_id_values",
    "Esql.user_id_values",
    "Esql.timestamp_first_seen",
    "Esql.timestamp_last_seen",
]

[rule.alert_suppression.duration]
unit = "h"
value = 24