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Detect Regasm with Network Connection

The following analytic detects the execution of regasm.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 3 logs to identify such behavior. This activity is significant as regasm.exe is a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary that can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary's attempt to establish a remote Command and Control (C2) channel, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further malicious actions within the environment.

Detection Query

`sysmon`
EventID=3
process_name=regasm.exe
NOT dest_ip IN (
  "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
  "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
  "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
  "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
  "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4"
)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  by action app dest dest_ip dest_port direction dvc protocol protocol_version src
     src_ip src_port transport user vendor_product process_name process_exec process_guid
     process_id
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`

Author

Michael Haag, Splunk

Data Sources

Sysmon EventID 3
Raw Content
name: Detect Regasm with Network Connection
id: 07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f
version: 16
creation_date: '2021-02-16'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of regasm.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 3 logs to identify such behavior. This activity is significant as regasm.exe is a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary that can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary's attempt to establish a remote Command and Control (C2) channel, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further malicious actions within the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 3
search: |
    `sysmon`
    EventID=3
    process_name=regasm.exe
    NOT dest_ip IN (
      "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
      "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
      "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
      "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
      "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4"
    )
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
      by action app dest dest_ip dest_port direction dvc protocol protocol_version src
         src_ip src_port transport user vendor_product process_name process_exec process_guid
         process_id
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
    - Living Off The Land
    - Handala Wiper
    - Hellcat Ransomware
    - Void Manticore
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.009
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit