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splunk_escuTTP
Detect Regasm with Network Connection
The following analytic detects the execution of regasm.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 3 logs to identify such behavior. This activity is significant as regasm.exe is a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary that can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary's attempt to establish a remote Command and Control (C2) channel, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further malicious actions within the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK
Detection Query
`sysmon`
EventID=3
process_name=regasm.exe
NOT dest_ip IN (
"10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
"127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
"192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
"192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
"198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4"
)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by action app dest dest_ip dest_port direction dvc protocol protocol_version src
src_ip src_port transport user vendor_product process_name process_exec process_guid
process_id
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Created
2026-03-16
Data Sources
Sysmon EventID 3
References
Tags
Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm ActivityLiving Off The LandHandala WiperHellcat RansomwareVoid Manticore
Raw Content
name: Detect Regasm with Network Connection
id: 07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f
version: 14
date: '2026-03-16'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of regasm.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 3 logs to identify such behavior. This activity is significant as regasm.exe is a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary that can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary's attempt to establish a remote Command and Control (C2) channel, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further malicious actions within the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 3
search: |
`sysmon`
EventID=3
process_name=regasm.exe
NOT dest_ip IN (
"10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
"127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
"192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
"192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
"198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4"
)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by action app dest dest_ip dest_port direction dvc protocol protocol_version src
src_ip src_port transport user vendor_product process_name process_exec process_guid
process_id
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: process_name
type: process_name
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
- Living Off The Land
- Handala Wiper
- Hellcat Ransomware
- Void Manticore
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog